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HANDLE VIA TALENT
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

TCS-2915-58
11 April 1958

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Utilization Advisory Board

ATTENTION: TALENT Central Officer, CIA

SUBJECT: Utilization of [REDACTED] and Middle East Photography ^{25X6}

REFERENCE: TCS-2968-58, dated 31 March 1958

I. PROBLEM:

It was the understanding of the TALENT Security Officer, CIA, that the meeting held 31 March 1958 in the Office of the TALENT Control Officer, CIA, at which a number of subjects were discussed re [REDACTED] and Middle East photography, included some problems which were not satisfactorily concluded to the point of finalization and agreement by all present.

A. Paragraph 1, b, and c, were agreed and concurred in.

B. Paragraphs 2, and 3, were agreed and concurred in.

II. EXCEPTIONS:

A. Exception was taken to Paragraph 1.a. of referenced paper, i.e., placing the "year and month" on each print.

B. Exception is taken to Paragraph 4, which states the sanitization procedure outlined in Paragraph 1 shall be forwarded [REDACTED] for their guidance in the handling of such [REDACTED] material as may reach them. It was specified that the materials would be [REDACTED] materials as opposed to "all [REDACTED] materials." ^{25X6} 25X1A

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C. Exception is taken to Paragraph 5, in Reference, in that it states the sanitization procedure established for [REDACTED] as outlined in Paragraph 1, be applicable to materials acquired in the Middle East and such sanitization be permitted in the ZI, by Theatre Commands [REDACTED]

25X1C

NOTE:

1. Even though sanitized, the release of this material in uncontrolled quantities from the TALENT Control System, could lead to wild speculation and discussion.
2. The material could most certainly be traceable to the processing unit accomplishing the sanitization.
3. The possibility exists that the operational source may be compromised generally even though the source capability may not readily be determined accurately.

In consideration of the listed observations above, it is the writer's belief that the releasing of sanitized TALENT materials with no continued control does not appear to be consistent with the Agency's and the United States' avowed policy of denying unauthorized overflights as a means of intelligence collection.

The disclosure of TALENT information to unauthorized persons, either inadvertently or by design, or by counter-intelligence methods of the country involved, could lead to a break in diplomatic relations with such country and generally jeopardize all U. S. international relations.

B. Exception is taken to Paragraph 6 in Reference which states in part,

"....Participating agencies, in case of emergency, are authorized to prepare emergency packages of sanitized materials for disposition with Theatre Commanders as required, the materials to be labeled 'CONFIDENTIAL - MODIFIED HANDLING AUTHORIZED;' documents to be

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material."

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NOTE: See NOTE to Paragraph C above. The security safe-guards stipulated under a "CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN Modified Handling" classification: Navy, SR Chap. III 9304; AFR 205-1-F; Army AR-380-5-(38) and R-10-305-6c, i.e.,

"Information so designated pertains to combat or combat related operations including aerial photography, negatives and related materials and these may be stored with a reasonably secure locking device. Transmission outside the U. S. may be by unaccompanied Department of State Air or surface pouch."

No restrictive provisions were made in TCS-2968-58 re transmission and control nor was the matter discussed. However, it is a matter of record that often unaccompanied State Department sea pouches have been lost, tampered with and contents stolen therefrom in transit. The only recourse the United States has is to file a protest with those foreign governments in whose ports the incidents are alleged to have occurred.

E. Exception is taken to Paragraph 7 in that some participating members raised questions set forth above which were not satisfactorily concluded by all concerned.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS:

After careful consideration it is believed that the best interest of security of the TALENT product will be served and the spirit of General Cabell's security instruction to General Balmer carried out if the following recommendations are supplemented to referenced document TCS-2968-58 and incorporated as an amendment to the original referenced paper.

A. Paragraph 1.a. be corrected to include that only the date of the "year" be specified rather than "month and year."

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B. Paragraph 4 be altered to specify that sanitization procedures (corrected) outlined in Paragraph 1 of Reference shall be forwarded to [REDACTED] for their guidance in the handling of specific selected "Area" materials as may reach them (as opposed to "any materials").

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C. Paragraph 5 in subject Reference be amended to read:

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"Sanitization procedures outlined in Paragraph 1 (corrected) of reference memorandum which are applied to select prints, positives, and uncontrolled mosaics relating to the [REDACTED] Area and currently being made available to [REDACTED] should also be applied as required to select TALENT materials obtained in the Middle East." 25X6

25X1C

In addition to those outlined in Paragraph 1 (corrected) of referenced memorandum, sanitization procedures should also be permitted within the ZI, by Theatre Commands, [REDACTED] provided that:

1. All such sanitization be accomplished by TALENT cleared personnel.
2. a. All such sanitized material be classified \$ECRET/ NOFORN/Continued Control.
b. DEF: "Continued Control," Information may be used in only that finished intelligence which bears the same control as the information itself including numbering and accountability.
3. No reference be made to TALENT, [REDACTED] CHESS, source or source capabilities and that the resultant product of select sanitized material be on a limited dissemination basis only as required.

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4. To prevent attention from being directed to the photography, the format and labelling will generally correspond in all possible respects to the standard Armed Services procedures for already existing materials of this type including numbering and accountability.
5. Only vertical exposures would be used for sanitization purposes and rectified enlarged cropped obliques for the uncontrolled mosaics.

D. Paragraph 6 be ~~amended~~ to include the following additional provisions for the safeguarding of sanitized TALENT materials for emergency combat or combat related operating use bearing the security classification "CONFIDENTIAL - Modified Handling."

1. Commanding Officers and Task Force Commanders will insure that maximum security is obtained consistent with operational considerations. Materials to be stored in a three-way combination safe (field type acceptable) when not in use this does not preclude a more secure means of storage at the discretion of the Commanding Officer.

2. Dissemination in emergency packages from the TALENT Processing centers or TALENT Control Centers to Field Commanding Officers be accomplished via officer-courier or ~~████~~ channels - never via unaccompanied State Department sea pouch. 25X6

3. Controls to be maintained by independent service accountability system this will also be an aid in registering sanitized material at TALENT Control Headquarters - HTAUTOMAT.

4. At the cessation of the area emergency all packaged sanitized materials are to be returned from the respective Task Force Commands to the Area Headquarters Command and ultimately to the Headquarters Command or TCO component for accountability, safe-keeping and/or destruction.

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5. It is recommended that sanitized TALENT materials not be released in uncontrolled quantities bearing standard conventional security classifications as indicated in reference memorandum; a method of Continued Control should be developed and applied to handle the dissemination of sanitized TALENT materials.

E. When the recommendations as set forth above have been agreed to in substance and principle and so amended in TCS-2968-58 the AQUATONE Security Officer, the Security Advisor for the Utilization Advisory Board and the CIA/TSO concur in the procedures as prescribed.

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CIA/TSO

CONCURRENCE:

SIGNED - See: Appendix A
AQUATONE Security Officer

15 APRIL '58
DATE

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Security Advisor, Utilization Advisory Board

17 April 1958
DATE

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